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There is an ongoing debate in policy circles about the appropriate accounting standards for public 
sector pension funds. There are major differences between the standard practice of most pension 
funds and the policies that are advocated by many academic economists, most notably Robert 
Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh (NM&R). In several papers they argue that most public sector pension 
funds are severely underfunded.1, 2 In recent years, most public sector pensions have been less than 
fully funded even using standard pension fund accounting. However, according to NM&R, the 
shortfalls are two to four times as large as indicated by standard pension accounting. 
 
While they raise a variety of issues about the accounting standards used by public sector funds, the 
two most important are the discount rate applied to pension fund liabilities and the time period over 
which the finances are assessed. NM&R argue that instead of using the expected return of pension 
fund assets to discount future liabilities, pensions should use the risk free interest rate on Treasury 
bonds. This leads to a considerably higher present discounted value on pension fund liabilities. The 
other major difference between NM&R’s methodology and the standard practice in pension 
accounting is that they propose a 15-year time horizon.3 This compares with the conventional 30-
year planning period for most pension funds. This means that any shortfall must be made up over a 
considerably shorter period of time.  
 
There has been considerable debate over the appropriateness of the standards recommended by 
NM&R. For example, an accounting rule that does not credit the higher returns on risky assets, like 
                                                          
1  See, for example, Novy-Marx, Robert, and Joshua Rauh (2008, 2009, 2011a, 2011b). 
2  See also Novy-Marx, Robert, and Joshua Rauh (2012) and Rauh (2010, 2011).    
3  Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009), pp. 200-205. 
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equities, could discourage pension fund managers from investing in equities or other risky assets. 
This could lead to a perverse situation in which individuals holding retirement funds in individual 
accounts assume the timing risk associated with holding equities, while pension funds, which invest 
collectively, do not. Another major issue with the NM&R approach is that it would lead to 
extraordinarily pro-cyclical funding patterns, especially if pension funds continued to invest in 
equities.4 Stock market downturns generally coincide with recessions, meaning that pension assets 
would be lower during a downturn. At the same time, interest rates also typically decline in a 
downturn, which would raise pension fund liabilities. The combined effect is to increase the size of 
the measured shortfall in a downturn. 
 
If pension funds respond by increasing their annual contribution, then state and local governments 
would have to increase their operating surplus during a downturn. This implies some combination 
of tax increases and spending cuts would be needed to make the additional payments implied by the 
shortfall. With most pension funds in a similar situation, the aggregate impact on the economy is 
likely to be substantial. At a time when more stimulus from the government sector would be 
desirable, this pattern of pension fund financing could be highly contractionary. 
 
In order to get a sense of the plausible size of this impact, this paper calculates the impact on the 
economy of adopting NM&R funding rules during the last recession. Specifically, it calculates the 
impact on GDP and employment if state governments had decided to fill the funding gap calculated 
by NM&R over a 15-year time horizon, as they advocate.  
 
The basic calculation is straightforward. The NM&R annual funding level would be the amount of 
new liabilities accrued by the fund each year, plus one-fifteenth of the shortfall they calculated. The 
amount of new liabilities for each state is taken from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College.5 We subtract the actual contribution reported for each state for the year. The difference is 
the additional amount of funding that the state would have needed to raise through a mix of 
spending cuts and additional taxes. This is shown in Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4  The problem of pro-cyclicality in pension fund financing is discussed in Baker (2011), Baker and Rosnick (2012), and Weller and 
Baker (2005). 
5  Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2015). 
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TABLE 1 
Cuts to State’s Budgets to Cover Pension Shortfalls 
 Cuts to State Budget Gross State Product (GSP) Cuts 
 (billions of dollars) (billions of dollars) (share of GSP) 
 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama $5.2 $5.1 $4.3 $169.4 $176.4 $182.4 3.1% 2.9% 2.4% 
Alaska $1.6 $2.1 $1.6 $49.7 $52.7 $56.9 3.3% 3.9% 2.8% 
Arizona $6.4 $6.4 $6.1 $243.3 $248.5 $257.0 2.6% 2.6% 2.4% 
Arkansas $3.1 $3.1 $3.3 $101.0 $106.0 $110.9 3.1% 2.9% 2.9% 
California $68.0 $59.0 $67.7 $1,915.7 $1,966.6 $2,034.0 3.5% 3.0% 3.3% 
Colorado $4.0 $6.5 $6.3 $250.3 $258.2 $266.6 1.6% 2.5% 2.4% 
Connecticut $5.9 $5.8 $4.9 $227.0 $232.5 $234.0 2.6% 2.5% 2.1% 
Delaware $0.7 $0.7 $0.8 $56.2 $57.5 $59.3 1.2% 1.1% 1.4% 
Florida $18.8 $10.1 $15.4 $722.8 $730.9 $736.9 2.6% 1.4% 2.1% 
Georgia $6.1 $10.1 $8.3 $406.1 $412.2 $424.5 1.5% 2.5% 2.0% 
Hawaii $2.4 $2.2 $2.9 $65.3 $67.7 $70.1 3.7% 3.2% 4.2% 
Idaho $1.4 $1.3 $1.3 $54.2 $55.7 $57.1 2.5% 2.4% 2.3% 
Illinois $23.6 $28.5 $23.9 $641.9 $655.0 $680.4 3.7% 4.3% 3.5% 
Indiana $3.9 $4.9 $4.0 $263.4 $283.0 $291.4 1.5% 1.7% 1.4% 
Iowa $3.2 $2.1 $3.5 $137.6 $142.3 $150.3 2.3% 1.5% 2.3% 
Kansas $2.8 $2.7 $2.4 $122.0 $127.9 $136.6 2.3% 2.1% 1.8% 
Kentucky $5.8 $5.5 $6.0 $156.5 $166.2 $172.9 3.7% 3.3% 3.5% 
Louisiana $4.5 $4.8 $4.1 $210.8 $233.2 $241.8 2.1% 2.1% 1.7% 
Maine $1.8 $1.4 -$0.1 $50.5 $51.7 $52.0 3.5% 2.8% -0.3% 
Maryland $6.2 $5.3 $5.8 $303.7 $314.4 $323.1 2.1% 1.7% 1.8% 
Massachusetts $6.4 $6.3 $6.5 $381.6 $398.1 $412.7 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 
Michigan $7.8 $10.7 $8.8 $366.4 $386.6 $398.9 2.1% 2.8% 2.2% 
Minnesota $7.8 $1.7 $6.4 $259.9 $273.0 $285.5 3.0% 0.6% 2.3% 
Mississippi $4.5 $3.3 $3.7 $92.4 $95.5 $97.8 4.9% 3.4% 3.8% 
Missouri $6.4 $6.3 $1.9 $249.8 $256.2 $258.0 2.6% 2.4% 0.7% 
Montana $1.1 $1.3 $0.9 $35.4 $37.3 $40.2 3.2% 3.4% 2.3% 
Nebraska $1.0 $1.0 $1.1 $87.2 $91.8 $99.0 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 
Nevada $4.3 $3.7 $3.5 $119.1 $119.5 $122.4 3.6% 3.1% 2.9% 
New Hampshire $1.3 $1.1 $1.7 $60.7 $62.9 $64.2 2.2% 1.8% 2.6% 
New Jersey $18.5 -$1.7 $15.1 $484.8 $494.1 $498.9 3.8% -0.3% 3.0% 
New Mexico $4.0 $3.1 $4.1 $81.1 $84.0 $86.7 4.9% 3.7% 4.7% 
New York $19.9 $23.2 $20.3 $1,143.0 $1,199.4 $1,234.1 1.7% 1.9% 1.6% 
North Carolina $6.9 $7.2 $6.4 $410.5 $422.1 $433.3 1.7% 1.7% 1.5% 
North Dakota $0.5 $0.8 $0.5 $32.0 $35.3 $40.5 1.7% 2.1% 1.2% 
Ohio $22.6 $22.9 $24.6 $477.6 $494.4 $520.4 4.7% 4.6% 4.7% 
Oklahoma $4.0 $4.3 -$1.4 $143.5 $152.1 $162.1 2.8% 2.8% -0.9% 
Oregon $4.3 $5.5 $5.5 $180.6 $191.5 $200.9 2.4% 2.9% 2.7% 
Pennsylvania $14.1 $15.0 $17.8 $566.5 $585.7 $602.7 2.5% 2.6% 2.9% 
Rhode Island $1.9 $3.5 -$1.4 $47.9 $49.3 $49.9 4.0% 7.2% -2.9% 
South Carolina $4.8 $5.0 $2.6 $161.6 $165.4 $171.6 3.0% 3.0% 1.5% 
South Dakota $0.9 $0.5 $0.8 $36.9 $38.7 $42.4 2.5% 1.3% 1.9% 
Tennessee $3.4 $4.6 $4.6 $248.0 $253.7 $264.1 1.4% 1.8% 1.7% 
Texas $22.5 $20.7 $21.0 $1,168.9 $1,247.6 $1,350.8 1.9% 1.7% 1.6% 
Utah $2.6 $2.0 $2.3 $113.9 $118.5 $124.7 2.3% 1.7% 1.8% 
Vermont $0.5 $0.3 $0.6 $25.3 $26.5 $27.6 1.9% 1.2% 2.3% 
Virginia $7.7 $10.4 $6.3 $410.3 $424.2 $432.2 1.9% 2.5% 1.5% 
Washington $6.9 $6.8 $6.7 $351.0 $362.5 $372.4 2.0% 1.9% 1.8% 
West Virginia $1.4 $1.5 $1.6 $63.1 $66.2 $69.9 2.3% 2.3% 2.2% 
Wisconsin $7.8 $7.7 $4.4 $246.1 $254.3 $263.8 3.2% 3.0% 1.7% 
Wyoming $0.9 $0.8 $0.7 $37.9 $40.2 $43.1 2.4% 2.0% 1.6% 
50 States $372.2 $346.8 $349.8 $14,230.3 $14,765.4 $15,308.7 2.6% 2.3% 2.3% 
Source and notes: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and authors’ calculations. 
 
As can be seen, the larger states generally would have needed the most additional revenue using this 
calculation, but several states with serious pension funding problems would need disproportionate 
cuts. For example, the cuts in Illinois would be equal to 3.7 percent of Gross State Product (GSP) in 
2009. In New Jersey they would be equal to 3.8 percent and 4.7 percent in Ohio. The additional 
pension funding implied by this calculation would also have large impacts on Mississippi and New 
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Mexico, which would have needed cuts and/or revenue increases equal to 4.9 percent of GSP. 
 
The next question is the impact on GDP and employment, given the depressed state of the 
economy. While in ordinary times the impact of spending cuts and/or tax increases may be largely 
offset by other spending from the private sector, this would likely not have been true in these years. 
Following other research on the impact of spending and tax cuts on the economy during the 
downturn we assume a multiplier of 1.5 for the cuts and tax increases imposed by the states to make 
up their pension shortfalls.6, 7  
 
A first set of calculations simply sums the additional pension funding across all states. As shown in 
Table 1, the additional funding would have been equal to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2.3 
percent of GDP in 2010 and 2011. Assuming a multiplier of 1.5, this translates into declines in 
output of 3.9, 3.5, and 3.4 percent in 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively. For simplicity we assume 
the job loss is proportionate to the drop in GDP. 
 
We next calculate the impact at the state level assuming that all states had suffered the same 
proportionate decline in GDP and job loss regardless of their level of pension underfunding. In 
effect, this assumes a $1 billion cut in spending in California has the same impact on Wisconsin’s 
economy as a $1 billion cut in spending in Wisconsin. The implied reductions in GDP and 
employment are reported in Tables 2a and 2b, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6  Acconcia and Simonelli (2011), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Belinga and Ngouana (2015), Clemens and Miran (2010), 
Congressional Budget Office (2012), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011), Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Reichling and Whalen (2012), 
Romer and Romer (2010), Serrato and Wingender (2010), Whalen and Reichling (2015), Woodford (2011), and Zandi (2008). 
7  Daniel Shoag found that the multiplier for public pension spending is greater than 2. See Shoag (2015). 
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TABLE 2a 
Lost Output Due to Additional Funding for Public Pensions Assuming Declines are Proportionate to Each 
State’s GSP  
(millions of dollars) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama $6,600 $6,200 $6,300 
Alaska $1,900 $1,900 $2,000 
Arizona $9,500 $8,800 $8,800 
Arkansas $4,000 $3,700 $3,800 
California $75,200 $69,300 $69,700 
Colorado $9,800 $9,100 $9,100 
Connecticut $8,900 $8,200 $8,000 
Delaware $2,200 $2,000 $2,000 
Florida $28,400 $25,700 $25,300 
Georgia $15,900 $14,500 $14,500 
Hawaii $2,600 $2,400 $2,400 
Idaho $2,100 $2,000 $2,000 
Illinois $25,200 $23,100 $23,300 
Indiana $10,300 $10,000 $10,000 
Iowa $5,400 $5,000 $5,200 
Kansas $4,800 $4,500 $4,700 
Kentucky $6,100 $5,900 $5,900 
Louisiana $8,300 $8,200 $8,300 
Maine $2,000 $1,800 $1,800 
Maryland $11,900 $11,100 $11,100 
Massachusetts $15,000 $14,000 $14,100 
Michigan $14,400 $13,600 $13,700 
Minnesota $10,200 $9,600 $9,800 
Mississippi $3,600 $3,400 $3,400 
Missouri $9,800 $9,000 $8,800 
Montana $1,400 $1,300 $1,400 
Nebraska $3,400 $3,200 $3,400 
Nevada $4,700 $4,200 $4,200 
New Hampshire $2,400 $2,200 $2,200 
New Jersey $19,000 $17,400 $17,100 
New Mexico $3,200 $3,000 $3,000 
New York $44,800 $42,300 $42,300 
North Carolina $16,100 $14,900 $14,900 
North Dakota $1,300 $1,200 $1,400 
Ohio $18,700 $17,400 $17,800 
Oklahoma $5,600 $5,400 $5,600 
Oregon $7,100 $6,700 $6,900 
Pennsylvania $22,200 $20,600 $20,700 
Rhode Island $1,900 $1,700 $1,700 
South Carolina $6,300 $5,800 $5,900 
South Dakota $1,400 $1,400 $1,500 
Tennessee $9,700 $8,900 $9,100 
Texas $45,900 $44,000 $46,300 
Utah $4,500 $4,200 $4,300 
Vermont $1,000 $900 $900 
Virginia $16,100 $14,900 $14,800 
Washington $13,800 $12,800 $12,800 
West Virginia $2,500 $2,300 $2,400 
Wisconsin $9,700 $9,000 $9,000 
Wyoming $1,500 $1,400 $1,500 
Source and notes: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and authors’ calculations. 
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TABLE 2b 
Jobs Lost by State Assuming Output Declines are Proportionate to Each State’s GSP 
(number of jobs) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 74,000 66,000 64,000 
Alaska 13,000 11,000 11,000 
Arizona 95,000 84,000 83,000 
Arkansas 46,000 41,000 40,000 
California 564,000 501,000 492,000 
Colorado 88,000 78,000 77,000 
Connecticut 64,000 57,000 56,000 
Delaware 16,000 15,000 14,000 
Florida 284,000 253,000 249,000 
Georgia 153,000 136,000 134,000 
Hawaii 23,000 21,000 20,000 
Idaho 24,000 21,000 21,000 
Illinois 222,000 198,000 195,000 
Indiana 110,000 99,000 97,000 
Iowa 58,000 52,000 51,000 
Kansas 53,000 47,000 46,000 
Kentucky 69,000 62,000 61,000 
Louisiana 75,000 66,000 65,000 
Maine 23,000 21,000 20,000 
Maryland 99,000 89,000 87,000 
Massachusetts 126,000 113,000 111,000 
Michigan 152,000 136,000 135,000 
Minnesota 104,000 93,000 92,000 
Mississippi 43,000 38,000 37,000 
Missouri 106,000 94,000 91,000 
Montana 17,000 15,000 15,000 
Nebraska 37,000 33,000 33,000 
Nevada 45,000 39,000 39,000 
New Hampshire 25,000 22,000 22,000 
New Jersey 153,000 136,000 132,000 
New Mexico 32,000 28,000 28,000 
New York 335,000 301,000 298,000 
North Carolina 153,000 136,000 134,000 
North Dakota 14,000 13,000 14,000 
Ohio 199,000 177,000 175,000 
Oklahoma 61,000 55,000 54,000 
Oregon 63,000 56,000 56,000 
Pennsylvania 220,000 198,000 195,000 
Rhode Island 18,000 16,000 16,000 
South Carolina 71,000 64,000 63,000 
South Dakota 16,000 14,000 14,000 
Tennessee 103,000 92,000 91,000 
Texas 404,000 364,000 362,000 
Utah 47,000 42,000 41,000 
Vermont 12,000 10,000 10,000 
Virginia 143,000 128,000 126,000 
Washington 112,000 100,000 99,000 
West Virginia 29,000 26,000 26,000 
Wisconsin 108,000 96,000 94,000 
Wyoming 11,000 10,000 10,000 
Source and notes: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and authors’ calculations. 
 
Obviously, tax increases or spending cuts within a state are likely to have more impact on the state’s 
economy than cuts taking place in other states. The difference will depend in part on the size of the 
state and also the distance from states experiencing large cuts. Cuts in spending in Alaska will have 
relatively little impact on the GDP of Nebraska. On the other hand, there is likely to be substantial 
spillover from cuts in Massachusetts to Rhode Island. In order to get a simplified calculation of the 
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effect of the cuts within each state, we assume that the GSP loss in each state would have been equal 
to its own cuts plus 0.5 times its proportionate share of the total cuts. Whereas the calculations for 
Table 2a assume a multiplier of 1.5 for the nation as a whole, the calculations in Table 3a assume 
two separate multipliers which sum to 1.5 for the nation as a whole. A multiplier of 1.0 is applied to 
cuts within the given state, while a multiplier of 0.5 is applied to the aggregate cuts across the 50 
states. For example, according to this calculation, the reduction in GSP in California in 2009 would 
be equal to the state’s own $68 billion in cuts that year, plus 0.5 times its proportionate share of the 
country’s $372 billion in cuts. The total lost GSP for California in 2009 by this calculation is $93 
billion. 
 
Tables 3a and 3b show the loss in GSP and jobs using this calculation. 
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TABLE 3a 
Lost Output due to Additional Funding for Public Pensions, Authors’ Preferred Methodology  
(millions of dollars) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama $7,400  $7,100  $6,400  
Alaska $2,300  $2,700  $2,200  
Arizona $9,600  $9,300  $9,000  
Arkansas $4,400  $4,300  $4,500  
California $93,000  $82,100  $91,000  
Colorado $7,300  $9,600  $9,400  
Connecticut $8,800  $8,600  $7,600  
Delaware $1,400  $1,300  $1,500  
Florida $28,300  $18,700  $23,800  
Georgia $11,400  $15,000  $13,200  
Hawaii $3,300  $3,000  $3,700  
Idaho $2,100  $2,000  $2,000  
Illinois $32,000  $36,200  $31,700  
Indiana $7,400  $8,200  $7,300  
Iowa $5,000  $3,800  $5,200  
Kansas $4,400  $4,200  $4,000  
Kentucky $7,900  $7,400  $8,000  
Louisiana $7,300  $7,600  $6,800  
Maine $2,400  $2,000  $400  
Maryland $10,200  $9,000  $9,500  
Massachusetts $11,400  $10,900  $11,200  
Michigan $12,600  $15,200  $13,300  
Minnesota $11,200  $4,900  $9,700  
Mississippi $5,700  $4,400  $4,800  
Missouri $9,700  $9,300  $4,800  
Montana $1,600  $1,700  $1,400  
Nebraska $2,200  $2,100  $2,200  
Nevada $5,900  $5,200  $4,900  
New Hampshire $2,100  $1,900  $2,400  
New Jersey $24,800  $4,100  $20,800  
New Mexico $5,100  $4,100  $5,100  
New York $34,800  $37,300  $34,400  
North Carolina $12,200  $12,100  $11,400  
North Dakota $1,000  $1,200  $1,000  
Ohio $28,800  $28,700  $30,500  
Oklahoma $5,800  $6,100  $500  
Oregon $6,700  $7,800  $7,800  
Pennsylvania $21,500  $21,800  $24,600  
Rhode Island $2,500  $4,100  ($900) 
South Carolina $7,000  $7,000  $4,600  
South Dakota $1,400  $1,000  $1,300  
Tennessee $6,600  $7,600  $7,600  
Texas $37,800  $35,300  $36,400  
Utah $4,100  $3,400  $3,700  
Vermont $800  $600  $900  
Virginia $13,100  $15,400  $11,200  
Washington $11,500  $11,000  $10,900  
West Virginia $2,300  $2,300  $2,400  
Wisconsin $11,000  $10,700  $7,400  
Wyoming $1,400  $1,300  $1,200  
Source and notes: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and authors’ calculations. 
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TABLE 3b 
Jobs Lost by State, Authors’ Preferred Methodology 
(number of jobs) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 82,000  76,000  66,000  
Alaska 15,000  16,000  13,000  
Arizona 96,000  89,000  85,000  
Arkansas 51,000  47,000  48,000  
California 698,000  593,000  642,000  
Colorado 65,000  82,000  80,000  
Connecticut 63,000  59,000  52,000  
Delaware 10,000  10,000  11,000  
Florida 283,000  183,000  234,000  
Georgia 109,000  140,000  121,000  
Hawaii 30,000  26,000  32,000  
Idaho 24,000  21,000  21,000  
Illinois 282,000  310,000  264,000  
Indiana 78,000  81,000  71,000  
Iowa 54,000  39,000  52,000  
Kansas 49,000  44,000  39,000  
Kentucky 89,000  79,000  82,000  
Louisiana 66,000  61,000  54,000  
Maine 29,000  23,000  5,000  
Maryland 85,000  72,000  74,000  
Massachusetts 96,000  88,000  88,000  
Michigan 133,000  152,000  132,000  
Minnesota 114,000  47,000  91,000  
Mississippi 68,000  50,000  54,000  
Missouri 104,000  96,000  50,000  
Montana 19,000  20,000  15,000  
Nebraska 23,000  22,000  21,000  
Nevada 57,000  48,000  45,000  
New Hampshire 22,000  19,000  24,000  
New Jersey 199,000  32,000  160,000  
New Mexico 51,000  39,000  47,000  
New York 260,000  266,000  242,000  
North Carolina 116,000  111,000  103,000  
North Dakota 11,000  12,000  9,000  
Ohio 306,000  292,000  300,000  
Oklahoma 64,000  62,000  4,000  
Oregon 60,000  65,000  63,000  
Pennsylvania 214,000  210,000  233,000  
Rhode Island 24,000  38,000  (8,000) 
South Carolina 78,000  76,000  49,000  
South Dakota 15,000  10,000  13,000  
Tennessee 70,000  78,000  77,000  
Texas 333,000  293,000  285,000  
Utah 42,000  34,000  36,000  
Vermont 10,000  7,000  10,000  
Virginia 116,000  132,000  96,000  
Washington 94,000  86,000  84,000  
West Virginia 27,000  26,000  26,000  
Wisconsin 122,000  115,000  77,000  
Wyoming 11,000  9,000  8,000  
50 States 5,117,000  4,588,000  4,478,000  
Source and notes: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and authors’ calculations. 
 
Had states cut their pensions in line with the methodology endorsed by NM&R, 5.1 million jobs 
would have been lost in 2009 as a result. California would have lost 698,000 jobs, followed by Texas 
with 333,000 lost jobs and Ohio with 306,000.  
 
Even the states with relatively few lost jobs would have experienced large declines in employment 
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relative to the size of their labor forces. In 2009, employment would have fallen 6.2 percent in New 
Mexico and Mississippi and 6.0 percent in Ohio. Employment would have also declined 5.0 percent 
or more in Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. In the three states with the 
smallest absolute number of lost jobs — Delaware, North Dakota, and Wyoming, which would’ve 
lost between 10,000 and 11,000 jobs each — employment would have declined 2.5 percent, 3.0 
percent, and 3.7 percent, respectively. All 50 states would have lost jobs in 2009 and 2010, and 49 
states would have lost jobs in 2011. This indicates that cutting public pension benefits in the middle 
of a recession would have been harmful in every state.  
 
 
The current debate over public pension fund accounting has raised many serious questions. 
However, it is important that this debate incorporate a clear understanding of the macroeconomic 
implications of different funding rules. One advantage of the current methodology is that it largely 
avoids the pressure for pro-cyclical funding patterns. On the other hand, the NM&R accounting 
method would likely lead to highly pro-cyclical funding patterns, especially if pension funds 
continued to invest in equities. As a result, efforts to make up pension shortfalls would likely 
aggravate recessions and lead to greater job loss. 
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